page 1
page 2
page 3
page 4
page 5
page 6
page 7
page 8
page 9
page 10
page 11
page 12
page 13
page 14
page 15
page 16

ExcerptDuress, Demanding Heroism and Proportionality, 41 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 741 (2008). Prosecutor v. Erdemovic presents a particularly difficult case for the defense of duress. In Erdemovic, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) tried the soldier Drazen Erdemovic for crimes against humanity. He was charged with systematically killing Muslim men and children in July 1995 as a member of the Bosnian Serb army. Initially, he refused to take part in the shootings, but his superiors threatened to kill him if he did not comply. At trial, Erdemovic confessed that he succumbed to the threats and killed nearly 70 people. Ultimately, the question before the ICTY Appeals Chamber was whether the defense of duress is available when the offense charged is a crime against humanity....it is unclear whether a defendant should be able to successfully plead duress when the harm caused was of epic proportions. It may very well be that, under certain extreme circumstances, society could legitimately require the coerced actor to do everything in her power, even sacrifice her own life, to avert the grave harm that would be inflicted if she succumbed to the threat. There-fore, it makes sense to ask whether a defendant like Erdemovic should be held responsible in view of the fact that the harm he inflicted (the deaths of dozens of people) is significantly graver than the one he averted (the loss of his own life). A satisfactory answer to this question requires an elucidation of the role of proportionality in the context of excuse defenses.Perspectives Fall 2011 3

Alexander K.A. Greenawalt Associate Professor of Law AB, Princeton University MA, Yale University JD, Columbia Law School"Why exactly do we identify certain - and only certain - offenses as international crimes?  What exactly does in-ternational law have to say about the criminal law, and how does the international setting change our intuitions about criminality?" In his article, "The Pluralism of International Criminal Law," published in the Indiana Law Journal, Greenawalt argues in favor of a pluralist model of international criminal law that does not seek to impose uniformity in all aspects of the substantive criminal law applicable to international offense, but instead takes seriously the domestic laws of the state or states that, under normal circumstances, would be expected to assert jurisdiction over a case. This article builds on related themes explored in other published articles, including "Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal Court" (Virginia Journal of International Law, 2009) and "Justice without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court" (New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 2007).Prior to joining the faculty at Pace Law School, Greenawalt honed his skills in international law while practicing inter-national arbitration at the firm Debevoise & Plimpton LLP. He was also a law clerk to Judge Stephen F. Williams on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and was the recipient of a Fulbright Scholarship, which he used to study the historical foundations of nationalism in the Balkans at the University of Zagreb in Croatia. This past fall, Greenawalt taught a course in international criminal law at Columbia Law School.The successful prosecution of an international crime from start to finish necessarily involves the application of a variety of legal principles that may bear little relationship to the particular criteria that define a crime as international.The Pluralism of International Criminal Law""4 Pace Law School