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Alexander K.A. Greenawalt Associate Professor of Law AB, Princeton University MA, Yale University JD, Columbia Law School"Why exactly do we identify certain - and only certain - offenses as international crimes?  What exactly does in-ternational law have to say about the criminal law, and how does the international setting change our intuitions about criminality?" In his article, "The Pluralism of International Criminal Law," published in the Indiana Law Journal, Greenawalt argues in favor of a pluralist model of international criminal law that does not seek to impose uniformity in all aspects of the substantive criminal law applicable to international offense, but instead takes seriously the domestic laws of the state or states that, under normal circumstances, would be expected to assert jurisdiction over a case. This article builds on related themes explored in other published articles, including "Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal Court" (Virginia Journal of International Law, 2009) and "Justice without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the International Criminal Court" (New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 2007).Prior to joining the faculty at Pace Law School, Greenawalt honed his skills in international law while practicing inter-national arbitration at the firm Debevoise & Plimpton LLP. He was also a law clerk to Judge Stephen F. Williams on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, and was the recipient of a Fulbright Scholarship, which he used to study the historical foundations of nationalism in the Balkans at the University of Zagreb in Croatia. This past fall, Greenawalt taught a course in international criminal law at Columbia Law School.The successful prosecution of an international crime from start to finish necessarily involves the application of a variety of legal principles that may bear little relationship to the particular criteria that define a crime as international.The Pluralism of International Criminal Law""4 Pace Law School

ExcerptThe Pluralism of International Criminal Law 86 Indiana Law Journal 1063 (2011).In this article, I challenge the idea that international criminal law ("ICL") does, or should require, uniformity in all aspects of its doctrine and practice. I argue that the search for consistency and uniformity is misguided, that the law applicable to international crimes should not be the same in all cases, that those culpable of like crimes should not receive like sentences in all cases, and that this result may in fact better serve the core purposes of ICL than the alternative. I argue for a hybrid or "pluralistic" model of ICL that does not assume ICL to be a closed system of criminal law, but that instead takes seriously the domestic laws of the state or states which, under normal circum-stances, would be expected to assert jurisdiction over a case. My argument proceeds from the acknowledgment that ICL operates in an irreducibly pluralistic environment. Its creation inevitably perpetuates or even creates inconsistencies and tensions in the domestic criminal justice systems to which it applies. On the one hand, the drive towards unification and consistency at the international level neces-sarily creates fracture and inconsistency at the domestic level. This is true in the obvious sense that international law is meant to bind states: for example, the international prohibition of genocide necessarily sits in tension with the laws of states that seek to legalize and encourage genocidal practices. That, of course, is the point. But the creation of a comprehensive and unified international legal system also creates other, less obvious, tensions with domestic criminal law. Even if domestic laws do not directly conflict with international criminal prohibitions, the develop-ment of a distinct international criminal law specific to international crimes can threaten the integrity of a state's criminal justice system by causing the state to adopt principles for international crimes that are inconsistent with those otherwise applied. After all, the successful prosecution of an international crime from start to finish necessar-ily involves the application of a variety of legal principles that may bear little relationship to the particular criteria that define a crime as international. These include, for example, the minimum mental element necessary to establish criminal culpability, the proper scope of duress as an excuse to murder, the correct balance between free speech rights and the criminal law, and the appropriate measure of punishment for the crime. These are all matters that also arise outside the area of international criminal law, and their appropriate resolution, at least as a prima facie matter, does not hinge on whether a crime happens to be international. In the context of domestic criminal law, moreover, states can and do take divergent approaches to these matters without violating applicable international obligations, including those imposed by international human rights law. After considering various possible justifications for developing a unitary ICL, I argue that ICL should instead be reconceptualized as a four-tiered body of law embracing four categories of substantive rules: (1) truly universal principles of ICL, (2) tribunal-specific rules, (3) rules constraining the acceptable range of domestic discretion, and (4) default rules. Although I do not attempt a comprehensive application of the model, I provide examples of rules belonging to each category, and I identify several areas-including modes of individual culpability, standards of mens rea, and sentencing practices-where domestic law has a legitimate role to play. Finally, I briefly consider the implications of the framework in three different procedural settings: domestic courts, international tribunals, and hybrid courts.Perspectives Fall 2011 5